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a b s t r a c t
Economic and sociological exchange theories predict divisions of exchange beneﬁts given an assumed
ﬁxed network of exchange relations. Since network structure has been found to have a large impact onfﬁciency
quality
ocial dilemma
actors’ payoffs, actorshave strong incentives fornetworkchange.Weanswer thequestionwhathappens to
both the network structure and actor payoffs when myopic actors change their links in order to maximize
their payoffs. We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that are efﬁcient or egalitarian
with varying tie costs, and the occurrence of social dilemmas. Only few networks are stable over a wide
range of tie costs, and all of them can be divided into two types: efﬁcient networks consisting of only
dyads and at most one isolate, and Pareto efﬁcient and egalitarian cycles with an odd number of actors.
rvedSocial dilemmas are obse
. Introduction
An exchange situation can broadly be deﬁned as a situation
nvolving actors who have the opportunity to collaborate for the
eneﬁts of all actors involved. While exchange has been intensively
tudied in economics for more than a century (e.g., Coddington,
968; Edgeworth, 1881; Young, 1975), exchange entered the ﬁelds
f social psychology and sociology only in the second half of the
wentieth century. Homans (1958, p. 606) introduced the idea that
social behavior is an exchange of goods, material goods but also
on-material ones, such as the symbols of approval and prestige’.
he conception of social behavior as exchange was also used by
ther prominent social scientists in the same time period, such as
hibaut and Kelley (1959) and Blau (1964). After these important
orks research on exchange as a model of social behavior gained a
rominent position in social psychology and sociology.
Since Stolte and Emerson (1977) and Cook and Emerson’s (1978)
eminal studies, sociologists have focused on the effect of social
tructures on exchange outcomes. The basic idea of this research
s that social behavior is shaped by the social relations in which
t occurs, which are in return conditioned by the structures within
hich theyareembedded (Willer, 1999,p. xiii).Where social behav-or is conceived of as exchange, the social relation is dubbed an
exchange relation’ and the structure is denoted an ‘exchange net-
ork’. If two persons have an exchange relation, this means that
oth persons have the opportunity to exchange, but they need
∗ Corresponding author at: Tilburg University, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
E-mail addresses: g.dogan@uvt.nl, gonul2517@gmail.com (G. Dog˘an).
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not do so. If they do not have an exchange relation, they have
no opportunity to exchange. These opportunities and restrictions
to exchange arise naturally in many real-life situations. Three of
the most common causes for the absence of an exchange relation
between two persons are natural barriers, non-matching prefer-
ences, and the decreasing marginal utility of relations. Examples of
barriers are not knowing each other, or not being able to contact
or meet each other. Also, two people might not have an exchange
relation because one of them has nothing to offer that is valuable
enough to the other. Finally, if maintaining each tie is costly and the
marginal beneﬁt of a relation decreases in the number of relations
one already has, it could be optimal to forego some relations.
In almost all sociological studies on exchange, both theoreti-
cal and empirical, the social structure is the independent variable,
i.e., what was studied was the effect of the network structure on
outcomes of persons in different network positions. These stud-
ies show that network structure has a large impact on what actors
earn in their exchange relations (e.g., Willer, 1999; special issue
Social Networks, June 1992; special issue Rationality and Soci-
ety, January 1997). The well-documented tendency for exchange
experiments with small sums of money to yield rather egalitar-
ian outcomes largely independent of experimental conditions (e.g.,
Roth, 1995) makes this result all the more pervasive. Since in dif-
ferent networks actors obtain different exchange beneﬁts, there is
an incentive for actors to change the network structure. Important
questions are, therefore, how exchange networks evolve in the ﬁrst
place, and which networks are stable or resistant to change. Note
that, although we attempt to answer these questions in the context
of exchange networks, these questions are relevant to any network
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epend on the network structure. Examples are communication,
nowledge, and friendship networks.
In our study the structure of the exchange network is the depen-
ent variable. We ask what structure can be expected to emerge
f actors have the opportunity to choose with whom to maintain
xchange relations, as a function of tie costs. We assume that the
ie costs are constant and both actors involved in a tie pay the tie
osts. Actors add and keep ties only if they are marginally beneﬁ-
ial. We investigate the networks that are stable, and the networks
hat are efﬁcient or egalitarian with varying tie costs. We have two
ain results. First, sparse networks consisting of only dyads and
dd-sized cycles are both stable and egalitarian over a wide range
f tie costs. Second, we ﬁnd that at low tie costs no even-sized net-
ork exists that is both stable and efﬁcient; we call this situation
‘social dilemma’, i.e., actors end up in networks where actors are
nwilling to delete a tie to reach a network in which all actors are
etter off.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we review the sociological
xchange literature and explain why we use Friedkin’s Expected
alue Theory for determining exchange beneﬁts in exchange net-
orks. We also outline the rules pertaining how actors engage in
xchange. In Section 3, we deﬁne network stability, efﬁciency, and
quality. In Section 4, we analyze the efﬁciency and equality of sta-
lenetworksasa functionof tie costs.Wepresent simulation results
or networks up to size 8 and prove three general theorems. These
eneral theorems hold for networks of any size and hold for all pub-
ished theories of networkexchange.Weconcludewith adiscussion
n Section 5.
. Theoretical background
An exchange network is a set of actors and their exchange rela-
ions within this set. Fig. 1 depicts some examples of exchange
etworks. In these networks, connected actors can exchange with
ach other. In sociological research on exchange networks, two
ssumptions have been commonly made that we also make in the
resent study (e.g.,Willer, 1999; special issue Social Networks, June
Fig. 1. Networks with expected excrks 31 (2009) 118–125 119
1992; special issue Rationality and Society, January 1997). First, an
exchange relation is represented as an opportunity to divide an
exchange beneﬁt of 24. Exchange occurs if two connected actors
can agree on a division. If they do not agree they obtain nothing in
that relation. Second, actors can only engage in one exchange, the
so-called one-exchange rule. Applied to the Line 3 (see Fig. 1), the
one-exchange rule implies that the central actor can exchange with
one of the two peripheral actors, but not with both.
Theories of network exchange predict how actors divide
exchange beneﬁts given the network structure. They specify the
expected exchange beneﬁts for each actor in the network. Many
theories of network exchange have been developed and tested in
the last three decades; power-dependence theory (e.g., Cook and
Emerson, 1978; Cook and Yamagishi, 1992), exchange-resistance
theory (e.g., Skvoretz and Willer, 1993), a graph analytic theory
using the graph-theoretic power index (GPI) (e.g., Markovsky et al.,
1988), core theory (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonachich, 1992), optimal
seek theory (Willer and Simpson, 1999), identity theory (Burke,
1997), Yamaguchi’s (1996, 2000) rational choice model, expected
value theory (e.g., Friedkin, 1992), non-cooperative bargaining
models (Berg and Panther, 1998; Braun and Gautschi, 2006), and
a recent model that takes sequentiality of exchange into account
(Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2008a). Four theories have received more
attention than the other theories (Willer, 1999; special issue Social
Networks, June 1992; special issue Rationality and Society, January
1997); core theory, power-dependence theory, expected value the-
ory, and NET, which is a combination of exchange-resistance, GPI,
and optimal seek theories.
We use one of these exchange theories to determine what
exchange beneﬁts actors obtain in a given network. Once exchange
beneﬁts are determined we can compare the differences in bene-
ﬁts of actors across different networks. We can then compute the
exact effect of adding and deleting ties on actors’ exchange bene-
ﬁts. Hence, an exchange theory is required that generates a unique
point prediction for the exchange beneﬁts of each actor in each
exchange network. Since core theory and power-dependence the-
ory do not provide unique point predictions they are not suitable
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or our investigation. We did not select NET because there are sev-
ral different versions of the theory, and the most recent version
f NET advocated by its developers has not been computerized
et (Emanuelson, 2005; Willer and Emanuelson, 2008). Conse-
uently, we select the remaining theory: Friedkin’s (1992, 1993,
995) expected value theory (EVT). Although uniqueness and exis-
ence for all networks isnotproven, for everynetworkup to8actors,
he algorithmof EVTgenerates apoint prediction. Previous research
uggests that EVT, like other theories of network exchange, predict
he outcomes of the exchange networks that are realized in the lab
ith reasonable accuracy (e.g., Friedkin, 1995; Van de Rijt and Van
ssen, 2008).
After establishing the exchange beneﬁts associated with each
osition in each network by using EVT, differences in beneﬁts
f actors across networks can be assessed. A number of studies
ave examined the effects of adding and deleting ties to one actor
n his expected beneﬁts, his neighbors’ expected beneﬁts, and
he overall power differences or variance in beneﬁts in the net-
ork (Leik, 1991, 1992; Willer and Willer, 2000; Van Assen and
an de Rijt, 2007). These studies examine the effect of exoge-
ous network changes, whereas we focus on endogenously stable
etworks. That is, the actors in their studies are passive with
espect to changing ties, while the actors in our study actively
onsider deleting and adding ties to maximize their expected
eneﬁts.
In our model, while the exact strategy space of the actors
epends on the stability concept employed, the unilateral deletion
nd bilateral addition of a tie is shared by all stability concepts con-
idered in this paper. An actor deletes a tie if the deletion results in
network in which he obtains a larger payoff. A pair of actors adds
tie between them if a network results in which at least one of
hem obtains a better payoff and none of them fares worse. Actors
hus only care about immediate improvements in expected pay-
ffs that are a direct consequence of their tie change. They do not
ake potential future rewards into account that could result from
ubsequent tie changes by other actors. They are myopic maximiz-
rs. Since both actors in a tie pay the tie costs, establishing a link
etween two actors requires mutual consent, whereas deletion of
tie is unilateral.
In this study it is assumed that equal tie costs are incurred for
oth actors involved in a tie. Tie costs apply for each tie that an
ctor has. We vary the tie cost from 0 to 12 to analyze the impact
f tie costs on the stable, efﬁcient, and egalitarian networks. Since
he amount to be divided in an exchange is 24, there always exists
n actor who wants to delete a tie for tie costs higher than 12.
uch costs need not be considered. In this paper, we use the term
xpected beneﬁts to refer to the expected beneﬁts from exchange
inus the tie costs incurred.
.1. Expected value theory
Building upon the theory of social power proposed by French
1956), Friedkin (1986) ﬁrst suggested the idea of using expected
alues to predict the outcomes in a power structure. Friedkin (1992,
993) extended the idea of expected values to analyze outcomes
n an exchange network. Friedkin’s model predicts the probability
ith which each maximal exchange pattern occurs, and the dis-
ribution of outcomes in each one of these patterns. A maximal
xchange pattern is maximal in the sense that no further feasi-
le transaction exists between the actors that have not exchanged
et. For example, the Line 4 (see Fig. 1) has two maximal exchange
atterns: each peripheral actor exchanges with one of the central
ctors, or the two central actors exchange with each other. Using
n iterative algorithm, each actor’s expected exchange beneﬁts are
alculated as the expected value of his exchange beneﬁts over all
ossible maximal exchange patterns.rks 31 (2009) 118–125
Despite what the name suggests, EVT is not a theory based on
actors rationally maximizing their beneﬁts. The algorithm generat-
ing the predictions assumes that both actors’ claim of their share in
their relation increases non-linearly in the probability that each of
them is excluded in any exchange. Three rules determine the ﬁnal
allocation in the relation. Which rule is applied depends on the
sum of both actors’ claims and their claims relative to half of the
exchange beneﬁts to be divided. See Friedkin (1995) for details of
the EVT model. An inconvenience of the EVT model is the analytical
intractability of the algorithm because of the non-linear function
and the three rules embedded in it. Another characteristic of EVT is
that its predictions satisfy symmetry (i.e., automorphically equiv-
alent positions get the same payoff), however, invariance under
scalar multiplication is violated (relative share is affected if all
resource pools are multiplied with the same constant). EVT implies
that the relative share of an actor decreases if the resource pool is
increased. See Van de Rijt and Van Assen (2008) for an overview of
properties of EVT and other theories of network exchange.
Fig. 1 shows expected exchange beneﬁts predicted by EVT for
several networks. For example, in the Line 3, it is expected that the
peripheral actor who exchanges with the central actor receives 2.9
out of 24, while the central actor obtains 21.1. Because peripheral
actors are only expected to exchangehalf of the time, their expected
beneﬁt is 1.45.
3. Deﬁnitions of stability, equality, and efﬁciency
We borrow our deﬁnitions of what constitutes a stable net-
work from a rapidly growing literature on network formation in
economics (e.g., Dutta and Jackson, 2003; Demange and Wooders,
2005; Goyal, 2007). Some networks considered in this literature
are similar to exchange networks. By doing so, we bring together
research on network exchange in sociology and research on net-
work formation in economics.
3.1. Stability
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the pairwise stability
concept. In his survey on network formation Jackson (2003) argues
that pairwise stability might be considered a necessary condition
for network stability. It is the weakest notion of stability that allows
for tie formation while providing narrow predictions about the set
of stable networks. An exchange network is pairwise stable if (i)
adding a currently absent tie is costly to at least one of the two
actors involved or leaves both actors equally well off, (ii) removing
a present tie does not beneﬁt either of the two actors it currently
connects.
As an example of how to use the notion of pairwise stabil-
ity, consider an 8-actor network where one actor is connected to
three other actors, but not to the remaining four actors. This can be
denoted by an ‘adjacency row’ 1110000, where the 1’s indicate the
three existing relations and the 0’s the four absent relations. Then,
with regard to the focal actor, pairwise stability holds if no single
change from 1 to 0 (the deletion of one tie) increases this actor’s
expected beneﬁts, and if no single change from 0 to 1 (the addition
of one tie) increases the expected beneﬁts of the focal actor while
not decreasing the expected beneﬁts of the other actor in this rela-
tion. A network is pairwise stable if the conditions above hold for
each actor in the network.
In our analysis we also use two stronger stability concepts that
are reﬁnements of pairwise stability: pairwise Nash and unilat-
eral stability. Pairwise Nash is a reﬁnement of pairwise stability,
and unilateral stability is a reﬁnement of pairwise Nash. We use
these two additional concepts for two reasons. First, we want to
examine whether our results are robust against alternative stabil-
ity concepts. Second, we are able to prove two general theorems
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A network is strongly pairwise stable (Gilles and Sarangi, 2004)
r pairwise Nash (Calvó-Armengol and I˙lkılıc¸, 2005) if (i) adding a
resently absent tie is costly to at least one of the two actors or
eaves both actors equally well off; and (ii) removing a subset of an
ctor’s present ties does not beneﬁt this actor. Note that condition
i) of pairwise Nash is identical to condition (i) of pairwise stability.
he difference between pairwise stability and pairwise Nash is that
airwise Nash allows for simultaneous deletions of ties. Continu-
ng our previous example, consider again the 8-actor network with
djacency row equal to 1110000 for the focal actor. Pairwise Nash
olds for this actor if each change of one 0 to 1 does not increase
is expected beneﬁts and the other actor is not worse off, and each
hange of a subset of 1s to 0s does not increase the focal actor’s
xpectedbeneﬁts.Anetwork ispairwiseNash if this conditionholds
or each actor in the network.
A network is unilaterally stable (Van de Rijt and Buskens, 2007;
uskens and Van de Rijt, 2008b) if no actor can proﬁtably recon-
gure his ties without objection by his new contacts. Different
rom pairwise stability, unilateral stability allows for simultane-
us addition and deletion of ties such that actors can replace one
ie with another as long as the addition of each new tie does not
ake the actor in the new tie worse off.1 In our example, unilat-
ral stability holds for the focal actor if no adjacency row other
han 1110000 simultaneously (i) increases this actor’s expected
eneﬁts, and (ii) makes no actor who is connected to the focal
ctor in the new network but disconnected in the old network
orse off. Only the actors newly connected have to agree, because
nly for creating new ties mutual consent is required. A network
s unilaterally stable if this condition holds for each actor in the
etwork.
.2. Egalitarian networks
Networks are deﬁned as egalitarian if all actors in the network
btain the same expected beneﬁts in which the subtraction of the
ie costs is included. Some examples of egalitarian networks are
omplete networks, cycles, and even-sized networks consisting of
nly dyads. We will categorize stable networks that are egalitarian.
.3. Efﬁciency
With the introduction of tie costs inefﬁcient pairwise stable net-
orks might arise. We distinguish two forms of efﬁciency. First, a
etwork is socially efﬁcient if, given tie costs, there is no other net-
ork in which the sum of the expected beneﬁts is larger than in
his network. Second, a network is Pareto efﬁcient if there exists no
ther network in which no actor earns less and at least one actor
arns more than in the given network. We will investigate if there
re tie cost levels for which no pairwise stable network of a given
ize is Pareto efﬁcient. If such tie cost levels exist, we say that there
s a tension between efﬁciency and stability and say that a social
ilemma exists. It is easy to see that social efﬁciency implies Pareto
fﬁciency.. Results
Friedkin’s EVT is a system of many assumptions and equations
hatmakes a formal analysis very difﬁcult. However,weprove some
1 If a network is unilaterally stable, then it is also pairwise stable, but the opposite
s not true.Hence it is possible that a network is pairwise stable at some cost level but
ot unilaterally stable; even if it is not proﬁtable to add a tie, or delete ties, an actor
ight proﬁtably reconﬁgure his network by adding more than one tie, or replacing
ome of his ties.rks 31 (2009) 118–125 121
general results on stability that concern networks of any size anddo
not depend on the use of EVT as a prediction method of exchange
beneﬁts. In addition, to getmore insight into theproperties of stable
networks, we analyze a subset of exchange networks; all 13,597
non-isomorphic exchange networks of size 2 through 8. We ﬁrst
present simulation results for these small networks obtained with
EVT, and then prove our general results.
4.1. Simulation results
For all exchange networks of size 2 through 8, we computed at
what tie cost levels each exchange network is pairwise stable, pair-
wiseNash, orunilaterally stable. Inorder toﬁnd these cost levels,we
calculated for each network, the highest cost level h forwhich some
pair of actors still wants to add a tie. In addition, we calculated the
lowest cost level l for which some actor still wants to remove one
or more ties (depending on the stability concept). Whenever the
resulting interval [h, l] is not empty, the network is stable for the
cost levels in this interval. The reason is that for these cost levels, tie
costs are too high to add ties and too low to remove ties. Because
we also need to check for simultaneous removal and addition of
ties to establish unilateral stability, some more conditions need to
be checked for unilateral stability. The details of this procedure can
be obtained from the authors.2
A ﬁrst general observation is that there are rather few networks
(at least for not too small network size) that are stable within some
tie cost range, and that the proportion of stable networks decreases
quickly with network size. If network size is 6, 17 out of 156 net-
works are pairwise stable of which 16 are pairwise Nash and 13
are unilaterally stable. This is about 10% of the total number of net-
works of size 6. When network size is 7, 40 out of 1044 networks
are pairwise stable, of which 34 are pairwise Nash and 30 unilater-
ally stable. Here the proportion of stable networks is around three
percent. Finally, for network size 8, 105 out of 12,346 networks (less
than 1%) are pairwise stable of which 93 are pairwise Nash and 72
are unilaterally stable.
Table 1 provides detailed information for a subset of stable net-
works, namely those that are pairwise stable over a tie cost range
spanning at least 1 exchange point (out of 24). We use the names
triangle, square, pentagon, hexagon, etc., for cycles of 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.,
actors. The word “full” is added if we refer to the complete network
with the same number of actors (see also Fig. 1). Table 1 reports
lower and upper bounds on the tie cost intervals for which the net-
works are stable. The lower bound for pairwise Nash is not reported
because it coincides with the lower bound for pairwise stability.
The reason is that they both refer to the highest cost level for which
some pair of actors still wants to add a tie. The table also reports
the density, tie costs for which the network is egalitarian, and tie
costs for which the network is both pairwise stable and Pareto efﬁ-
cient. Stable networks in Table 1 consist of either one component
or of multiple disconnected components in which everybody has
an automorphically equivalent position and therefore expects the
same beneﬁts. Between components there can be differences in
expected beneﬁts. Note that if all components are identical, stable
networks are egalitarian irrespective of the tie costs.
Social efﬁciency is not included in the table because for posi-
tive tie costs the only socially efﬁcient networks that exist are the
dyads, possibly in combination with one isolate if the number of
actors is odd. We call the unconnected dyads and at most one iso-
late M(inimal) networks. Given nonzero tie costs M networks are
theunique socially efﬁcient networks. InMnetworks themaximum
number of exchanges is realized with a minimal number of ties.
2 All calculationswereprogrammed inBorlandDelphi. The source code is available













Pairwise stable networks that are stable in a tie cost range larger than one.










Density Tie costs for which
egalitarian
Tie costs for which
pairwise stable and
Pareto efﬁcient
Dyad 2 −∞ 12 12 −∞ 12 1 Always ≤12
Dyad, isolate 3 1.449 12 12 1.449 12 0.333 12 1.449–12
Triangle −∞ 6.551 4 −∞ 4 1 Always <4
Two dyads 4 3.482 12 12 3.482 12 0.333 Always 3.482–12
Triangle, isolate 4.114 6.551 Not pairwise Nash Not unilaterally stable 0.5 4 Never
Square 2.811 5.138 5.138 2.811 5.138 0.667 Always Never
Full square −∞ 4.026 3.943 −∞ 3.943 1 Always ≤0
Two dyads, isolate 5 3.482 12 12 3.482 12 0.2 12 3.482–12
Square, isolate 2.811 5.138 5.138 Not unilaterally stable 0.4 6 Never
Triangle, dyad −0.536 6.551 4 0.488 4 0.4 Never −0.536 to 4
Pentagon 0.124 5.95 4.8 0.366 4.8 0.5 Always 0.124–4.8
Full pentagon −∞ 0.839 0.839 −∞ 0.839 1 Always ≤0
Three dyads 6 3.482 12 12 3.482 12 0.2 Always 3.482–12
Triangle, dyad, isolate 4.114 6.551 Not pairwise Nash Not unilaterally stable 0.267 Never Never
Pentagon, isolate 3.326 5.95 4.8 Not unilaterally stable 0.333 4.8 Never
Square, dyad 2.811 5.138 5.138 2.811 5.138 0.333 0 Never
Hexagon 2.723 5.15 5.15 2.723 5.15 0.4 Always Never
3,3-Full bipartite 1.941 3.007 3.007 1.941 3.007 0.6 Always Never
Two triangles 1.553 6.551 4 Not unilaterally stable 0.4 Always Never
Full square, dyad 1.178 4.026 3.943 1.178 3.943 0.467 0 Never
Full hexagon –∞ 2.104 2.033 −∞ 2.033 1 Always ≤0
Three dyads, isolate 7 3.482 12 12 3.482 12 0.143 12 3.482–12
Square, dyad, isolate 2.811 5.138 5.138 Not unilaterally stable 0.238 Never Never
Hexagon, isolate 2.78 5.15 5.15 Not unilaterally stable 0.286 6 Never
Triangle, two dyads 3.482 6.551 4 3.482 4 0.238 Never 3.482–4
Pentagon, dyad 0.124 5.95 4.8 0.622 4.8 0.286 Never 0.124–4.8
Two triangles, isolate 4.114 6.551 Not pairwise Nash Not unilaterally stable 0.286 4 Never
Heptagon 0.796 5.769 5.143 0.796 5.143 0.333 Always 0.796–5.143
Square, triangle 2.811 5.138 4 2.811 4 0.333 Never Never
Full square, triangle −0.042 4.026 3.943 2.977 3.752 0.429 4 −0.042 to 0
Full pentagon, dyad −0.662 0.839 0.839 0.432 0.839 0.524 Never −0.662 to 0
Full heptagon –∞ 0.395 0.395 −∞ 0.395 1 Always ≤0
Four dyads 8 3.482 12 12 3.482 12 0.143 Always 3.482–12
Triangle, two dyads, isolate 4.114 6.551 Not pairwise Nash Not unilaterally stable 0.179 Never Never
Pentagon, dyad, isolate 3.326 5.95 4.8 Not unilaterally stable 0.214 Never Never
Square, two dyads 3.482 5.138 5.138 3.482 5.138 0.214 0 Never
Heptagon, isolate 3.059 5.769 5.143 Not unilaterally stable 0.25 5.143 Never
Hexagon, dyad 2.723 5.15 5.15 2.723 5.15 0.25 0 Never
Square, triangle, isolate 4.114 5.138 Not pairwise Nash Not unilaterally stable 0.25 Never Never
3,3-Full bipartite, dyad 1.941 3.007 3.007 1.941 3.007 0.357 0 Never
Two squares 2.811 5.138 5.138 2.811 5.138 0.286 Always Never
Octagon 1.635 5.282 5.2 1.944 5.2 0.286 Always Never
Two triangles, dyad 1.553 6.551 4 Not unilaterally stable 0.25 Never Never
Pentagon, triangle 0.774 5.95 4 2.47 4 0.286 Never Never
Square, full square 2.811 4.026 3.943 2.811 3.943 0.357 0 Never
Two full squares 1.456 4.026 3.943 1.456 3.876 0.429 Always Never
Full hexagon, dyad 0.594 2.104 2.033 0.594 2.033 0.571 0 Never
Full octagon −∞ 1.326 1.254 −∞ 1.254 1 Always ≤0
The number of networks that are pairwise stable in some cost range smaller than 1 and hence not included in the table for size 2 to 8 are respectively, 0, 0, 0, 2, 7, 28, and 88. There is one other network for size 6 that is egalitarian
and stable in a small range and one that is egalitarian but not stable. There is also one other egalitarian network with 7 actors that is stable in a small range. There are 7 other networks of size 8 that are egalitarian from which 6
fulﬁll all stability criterions for a small range. The remaining network is unstable.
There are more other networks that are pairwise stable and Pareto efﬁcient especially for sizes equal to 5 and 7 for small cost ranges. Examples are the hourglass and the hourglass +dyad, which are both pairwise stable and Pareto
efﬁcient for cost = 1. All these other networks are non-egalitarian and have a subset of actors who are relatively well off.
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otal exchange beneﬁts cannever be larger and costs areminimized
n M networks. In Table 1 we see that all socially efﬁcient M net-
orks are stable if tie costs are large enough, larger than 3.48 in the
ase of EVT. For even-sized networks, these networks are also egal-
tarian, and Pareto efﬁcient. For odd-sized networks, there is some
nequality in these networks because one actor obtains nothing.
The density of stable networks in general decreases with tie
osts, althoughnotmonotonically. As anexample, consider thepair-
ise stable networks of size 4. All pairwise stable networks of size 4
re listed in Table 1. For tie costs in the interval [0, 4.026], the com-
lete networkwithdensity 1 is pairwise stable. The square (4-cycle)
ith density 2/3 is pairwise stable for tie costs in [2.811, 5.138]. The
network (2 dyads) with density 1/3 is pairwise stable when tie
osts are in [3.482, 12]. A triangle and an isolate, with density 1/2,
s pairwise stable for tie costs in [4.114, 6.551]. Interestingly, the
ften investigated Line 4 network is not stable at any tie cost; for
ie costs larger than 3.482 the actors with two ties prefer to delete
heir connection in order to form a dyad, and for tie costs smaller
han 5.138 the two peripherals prefer to be connected to each other.
ence, our analysis suggests that in real-life exchange settings that
esemble the point of departure of our analysis, the Line 4 network
ill not occur often.
Because stable networks at low tie costs have a higher density
han the socially efﬁcient M networks, a social dilemma situation
ight exist. Indeed, if tie costs are smaller than 3.48 the even-sized
network is not stable (see also Theorem2below) but Pareto dom-
nates the stable networks for such tie costs. Hence EVT predicts
ocial dilemma situations for tie costs smaller than 3.48 in even-
ized exchange networks of size 4, 6, 8; the networks will evolve
nto stable networks that are ‘overconnected’ andParetodominated
y the M networks. In odd-sized networks, there exist other Pareto
fﬁcient stable networks in addition to the M network because all
ctors gain more than the isolate in the M network.
Althoughmost networks listed in Table 1 aswell as the other sta-
le networks are not egalitarian, differences in exchange beneﬁts
cross actors are mostly not large. First, no pairwise stable network
s a so-called ‘strongpower’ network (Willer, 1999, pp. 109–111), i.e.,
here is no network up to size 8 with a minority of actors earning
lmost all points in their exchange relations. The largest beneﬁt dif-
erences arise in odd-sized M networks. Within components some
ctors might earn a bit more than others, the hourglass network
ith ﬁve actors (see Fig. 1) is one example, but if power difference
ecomes too large within components, there are always actors in
hese componentswhodo seek other exchange relations, rendering
he network unstable.
.2. Analytic results
The analysis of networks up to size 8 demonstrates that M net-
orks are important: they are efﬁcient, stable for a large tie cost
nterval, and egalitarian if the network size is even. Here we show
ome general results on the efﬁciency (Theorem 1) and stability
Theorems 2 and 3) of M networks of any size. Throughout the
emainder of the section, the only assumptions made about the
istribution of exchange beneﬁts with no side payments are3 (i)
f two actors can exchange with one another and do not exchange
ith third parties then theywill exchangewith one another, and (ii)
f they both have only one exchange relation they divide exchange
eneﬁts in that relation equally. With the exception of core theory
3 The assumptions are related only to the distribution of exchange beneﬁts. Hence
he results apply to any exchangedistributionmechanismgiven that (i) thenetworks
reundirectedunder the1-exchange rule, (ii) there ismutual consent for tie addition,
iii) tie deletion is unilateral, and (iv) equal tie costs are incurred for both parties in
he tie.rks 31 (2009) 118–125 123
– which leaves exchange divisions in isolated dyads unspeciﬁed –
all exchange theories that have been proposed in the sociological
literature satisfy these requirements.
As we have already argued in the previous subsection, M net-
works are socially efﬁcient networks and, therefore, they are also
Pareto efﬁcient as is summarized in the ﬁrst theorem.
Theorem 1. An M network is socially efﬁcient (and therefore also
Pareto efﬁcient) for any tie cost c in the closed interval [0, 12].
ProofofTheorem1. Total beneﬁts aremaximalbecause themaxi-
mumnumberof exchanges,n/2 (roundeddown ifn is odd), is always
carried out. Any additional tie reduces the total proﬁt by 2c. Also,
the marginal beneﬁt of each tie in the M network is 24, which is the
highest possible marginal beneﬁt a tie can have. For c in [0, 12], the
increase in net total beneﬁt from each of these ties is nonnegative.

In particular,M networks are the only socially efﬁcient networks
for tie costs in the interval (0, 12). There are other socially efﬁcient
networks if tie costs are equal to 0, because in that case any net-
work that guarantees the maximal number of exchanges is socially
efﬁcient. There are also other Pareto efﬁcient networks. For even-
sizednetworks, these Pareto efﬁcient networks are non-egalitarian.
By deﬁnition an M network has the minimum number of ties with
the maximum number of exchanges. Hence, any Pareto efﬁcient
network other than the M network has more ties than the M net-
work. If another Pareto efﬁcient network is also egalitarian, then
the M network Pareto dominates it for any tie cost larger than zero,
which is a contradiction. None of the other Pareto efﬁcient even-
sized stable networks are included in Table 1, since these networks
are stable only for narrow tie cost ranges. For odd-sized networks,
many Pareto-efﬁcient stable networks exist. One of these networks
is the cycle with all actors involved, which is egalitarian and stable
over a wide range of tie costs.
M networks are unilaterally stable (and hence pairwise Nash,
and pairwise stable) for high tie costs. For pairwise Nash and pair-
wise stability, this result can be generalized to networks of any size
and any exchange theory, as Theorem 2 shows. Consider a value
d=max(e−12, min(f−12, g)), where e is the exchange beneﬁt of a
central actor in the Line 4, f the exchange beneﬁt of the central actor
in the Line 3, and g the exchange beneﬁt of the peripheral actor in
the Line 3. For example, d=3.48 for EVT, since e=15.48, f=21.1, and
g=1.45.
Theorem2. AnMnetwork of any size is pairwiseNash (and therefore
also pairwise stable) for tie costs c in (d, 12)
Proof of Theorem 2. Because everyone with a tie obtains bene-
ﬁts from the exchange equal to 12 in an M network, no one wants
to remove a tie as long as the tie costs are below 12. Since actors
can only add one tie, there are only two possible additions. First, if
two dyads connect with each other the connecting actors see their
exchange beneﬁts raise to e. Thus, tomake this change unproﬁtable,
tie costs should exceed the marginal beneﬁts of these actors, which
equal e−12. In odd-sized networks the isolate can try to connect
to a dyad, raising his partner’s expected beneﬁts to f, obtaining g
himself. For this tie addition to be unproﬁtable, tie costs should
exceed the lowest marginal beneﬁt across the two actors, which is
min(f−12, g). Therefore, pairwise Nash stability is established for
the interval (d, 12). 
Table 1 suggests that given EVT beneﬁts, the M network is the
only pairwise stable network at tie costs larger than 6.55. Networks
other than M networks that are pairwise stable at, e.g., c=6.5, con-
sist of combinations of triangles, dyads, and at most one isolate. We
were unable to prove that M networks are the only pairwise stable
networks for any tie costs c in (6.55, 12) using EVT. Nonetheless,
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nd unilaterally stable networks are M networks regardless of the
heory used. Note that triangles are not pairwise Nash for c>4 since
ne actor can improve his payoffs with 2c−8 by deleting two links
t the same time.
heorem 3. The only pairwise Nash (and unilaterally stable) net-
orks with c in (6, 12) are M networks.
roof of Theorem 3. The networks with fewer ties than M net-
orks are not stable since tie addition is proﬁtable for two isolates.
ence, it sufﬁces to show that in any network with more ties than
n M network with c in (6, 12) at least one actor wants to delete
t least one of his ties. Such a network has at least one actor with
wo ties. Let us ﬁrst assume everyone has more than one tie. Then
veryone pays more than 12 for the ties. However, not everybody
an earn more than 12. Thus, someone has negative net earnings
nd is better off deleting all ties. Hence, there should be at least one
ctor with one tie who has a neighbor with at least two ties (other-
ise we have the M network). Let us label the actor with one tie as
, A’s neighbor with at least two ties as B, and one of B’s neighbors
ther than A as C. Actor A should have at least an expected beneﬁt c
rom exchange, otherwise he would remove the tie. Actor B should
ave at least 12+ c as exchange beneﬁt from his two ties, otherwise
e would remove all his ties except with A, and get an exchange
eneﬁt of 12. But actor B can earn at most 24− c from his exchange
ith Awhich is less than 12+ c for c in (6, 12). So actor B should earn
ore than 24− c in at least one of his other exchanges, and without
oss of generality this neighbor is C. However, now actor C earns
ess than c from his exchange with B, and hence actor C prefers to
elete the tie. 
. Discussion
Research on network exchange in sociology has focused on the
ffect of the social structure on outcomes of exchange. In almost
ll of this research, the exchange network has been exogenous and
he independent variable. The main result of this research is that
etwork structure has a large impact on what actors earn in their
xchange relations. Because positions in different networks obtain
ifferentbeneﬁts, thereexist incentives for actors to change thenet-
ork. Subsequently, the questions of how these networks evolve,
nd which networks are stable arise. In the current article we study
hat the network structure looks like if actors have the opportu-
ity to choose with whom they have an exchange relation, that is,
he network structure is our dependent variable.
We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that
re efﬁcient or egalitarian with varying tie costs, and the occur-
ence of social dilemmas. We employed the assumptions mostly
sed in the sociological literature on exchange networks, including
he one-exchange rule and that the value of each exchange relation
s the same. Additionally, we assume that actors delete and add
ies in order to maximize their expected beneﬁts; for adding ties
utual consent is needed, whereas tie deletion is unilateral. Ties
re costly and the costs are the same for both actors in the tie. To
ssess the stability of exchange networks we employ three stabil-
ty concepts from the economic literature on networks: pairwise
tability, pairwise Nash, and unilateral stability. In addition, social
fﬁciency andPareto efﬁciency are used as efﬁciencymeasures, and
he networks are considered egalitarian if all actors in the network
xpect the same beneﬁts. To calculate the actors’ expected beneﬁts
e use Friedkin’s Expected Value Theory. First, we investigate all
etworks up to size 8. Then we prove three general results.Few networks are stable over a wide range of tie costs, and
ll of them can be divided into two types: M networks consist-
ng of only dyads and at most one isolate, and cycles with an odd
umber of actors. Even-sized M networks and odd cycles are egal-
tarian. As we have shown, M networks of any size are the onlyrks 31 (2009) 118–125
socially efﬁcient networks for any tie costs but they are only stable
starting from intermediate cost levels. Hence, any stable network
is socially inefﬁcient at low tie costs. Finally, we observe social
dilemmas at low tie costs in even-sized networks; that is, none of
the (socially inefﬁcient) stable networks are Pareto efﬁcient. Using
pairwise Nash or unilateral stability does not change any of these
results.
A remarkable result is that almost all egalitarian networks up
to size 8 are stable at some tie costs. Although actors in our model
maximize their own expected beneﬁts that do not include equal-
ity preferences, they can be “satisﬁed” in egalitarian networks.
Nonetheless, many non-egalitarian networks are stable as well.
Thus, it is an interesting empirical question whether exchange net-
works evolve into non-egalitarian networks in real world settings.
To what extent actors’ preferences for equality [as in Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999] do affect the stability of networks, and whether
these preferences are observed in the evolution of (exchange) net-
works remains to be examined.
Although there exist stable networks that are also efﬁcient at
some tie costs, most stable networks are not efﬁcient. Hence, ten-
sions between stability and efﬁciency arise over a wide range of
tie costs. This tension is strongest in even-sized networks at low
tie costs where social dilemmas occur, because at such tie costs
no stable network is Pareto efﬁcient. It is an interesting empirical
question whether actors resist the immediate temptation and end
up in the both socially and Pareto efﬁcient but not stable M net-
work. Preferences for efﬁciency can be incorporated in the actors’
utility function as in Charness and Rabin (2002), and the effect of
efﬁciency and equality preferences on the evolution and stability
of networks can thus be examined.
The results of our study can be compared to those of Bonacich
(2001), and Van de Rijt and Buskens (forthcoming) who studied
the dynamics of sociological exchange networks. Bonacich (2001)
simulated exchange network evolution and found that, in equilib-
rium, differences in beneﬁts were small. One important difference
between our analysis and Bonacich’s analysis is that in his simula-
tion the actors are assumed to be myopic satisﬁcers such that they
change the network if their earnings drop below a certain level. In
our study however, the actors are assumed to be myopic maximiz-
ers such that they change the network as long as marginal beneﬁts
outweigh marginal tie costs. Another difference is that instead of
adding or deleting ties, Bonacich’ actors move to another cell on
a checkerboard, where they can exchange with actors in adjacent
squares. Interestingly, despite these different assumptions, he also
arrives at the conclusion that in equilibrium networks are egal-
itarian. Bonacich (2004) provides some intuitions for how this
approach can be extended to more general structures. Van de Rijt
and Buskens (forthcoming) analyzed the stability of exchange net-
works employing the same stability concepts, but using another
exchange theory, and without focusing on efﬁciency and equality.
Our stability results are very similar to the ones reported in their
paper, and conﬁrm the robustness of the dynamics results across
exchange theories.
The focus of the present article is on the possible path ends
of the evolution of exchange networks, i.e., the stable networks.
Consequently, a natural extension is investigating how to get to
these possible endpoints, i.e., the evolution of the network. The
probability of reaching each stable network could also be inves-
tigated. Factors that could determine these probabilities are the
initial network conﬁguration, tie costs, and preferences for equality
and efﬁciency. It might also be that stable networks differ in their
robustness to the errors of actors. In some stable networks one error
might be enough to move to another stable network, whereas other
stable networksmight be stable after one ormore accidental errors.
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In our analysis we assume that actors are myopic; they only take
heir immediate beneﬁts into account but not the consequences of
heir behavior on future beneﬁts. The justiﬁcation of this assump-
ion is that not only it makes the analysis more tractable, but also
hat actor behavior in the laboratory seems to be rather myopic
s well. Most actors are found to think two, or at most three steps
head inmanydifferent experimental games (Camerer, 2003, Chap-
er 5). Nevertheless, in their book on network formation Dutta
nd Jackson (2003, p. 13) argue that allowing for farsighted actors
n models of network evolution is “perhaps the most important
and possibly the hardest) issue regarding modeling the formation
f networks”. Actors taking the future into account are likely to
ffect the evolution and stability of exchange networks. To mention
wo examples, taking the future into account gives opportunities
o solve social dilemmas and the problems of inefﬁciency of sta-
le networks as described above. An even-sized M network that
s efﬁcient but not stable can be sustained as equilibrium if the
ctors are rational and the ‘network evolution game’ is indeﬁnitely
epeated. Similarly, an odd-sized M network that is efﬁcient but
either stable at low tie costs nor egalitarian can be sustained as
quilibrium if the shadow of the future is sufﬁciently long, and if
he actors coordinate on alternating the excluded actor. Alternat-
ng the excluded actor ensures that both efﬁciency and equality are
atisﬁed.
The implications of the current study extend to other social
etworks among which are communication, knowledge, and
riendship networks. In these networks similar questions of sta-
ility are of interest such as whether only few networks are stable,
nd whether stable networks tend to be egalitarian. As Jackson and
olinsky (1996) showed with a theorem in their seminal paper,
here exist a tension between stability and efﬁciency in different
conomic and social network contexts. Thus, analyzing whether
ctors form socially inefﬁcient but stable networks that correspond
o social dilemma situations is particularly appealing. For example,
uskens and Van de Rijt (2008b) show that efﬁciency, stability, and
qual divisions of outcomes can also go hand in hand even in com-
etitive network formation settings in which everybody strives for
central network position. Considering the importance of network
tudies in aforementioned ﬁelds, more of such analyses are to be
xpected.
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